On competition and banking

In this thesis we discussed several aspects of bank behavior under imperfect competition. As we argued in chapters 1 and 2, the loss of production and growth and the suboptimal welfare level resulting from imperfections in banking can only partly be explained by transaction costs and asymmetric information - the traditional justifications for financial intermediation. Empirical evidence suggests that banking markets are characterized by another imperfection: imperfect competition. Thus, the study of the strategic behavior of individual actors, i.e. banks, may yield further understanding of the functioning and development of banking markets. This issue is dealt with by the Industrial Organization (IO) approach to banking. In general, our study fits into this approach.

	titlepages/contents
	chapter 1
	chapter 2
	chapter 3
	chapter 4
	chapter 5
	chapter 6
	chapter 7
	chapter 8
	chapter 9
	chapter 10
	bibliography
	samenvatting
	thesis

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