

RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

**TRADEABLE CO<sub>2</sub> EMISSION PERMITS IN EUROPE**

A study on the design and consequences of a system of tradeable permits for  
reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the European Union

**Proefschrift**

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Straatsburg

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# CONTENTS

## Acknowledgements

1	Introduction	1
2	Designing a system of tradeable carbon permits for the European Union	7
2.1	Introduction	7
2.2	Tradeable permits	8
2.3	Grandfathering, relocation and competition from abroad	13
2.4	Outline and feasibility of a system of tradeable carbon-permits	17
2.5	Conclusions	32
3	Entry barriers and tradeable emission permits I	35
3.1	Introduction	35
3.2	The theory of entry barriers	37
3.3	Entry barriers and tradeable emission permits: opportunity costs	41
3.4	Transaction costs and the limit pricing model	43
3.4.1	Introduction	43
3.4.2	Fixed transaction costs	46
3.4.3	Variable transaction costs	53
3.5	Conclusions and practical consequences	71
4	Entry barriers and tradeable emission permits II	75
4.1	Tradeable permits and the long purse theory	75
4.1.1	History of the long purse theory	76
4.1.2	Predation and grandfathering	83
4.1.3	Empirical evidence on capital requirements as an entry barrier	99
4.2	Tradeable permits and exclusion	105
4.3	Conclusions	113

5	Coordination of environmental policy in a second-best world	117
5.1	Introduction	117
5.2	General equilibrium model of a tax on an externality in a second-best world	119
5.3	Non-cooperation and cooperation in a second-best world	124
5.3.1	Non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium	124
5.3.2	Cooperative equilibrium	126
5.3.3	Joint optimum and the use of sidepayments	129
5.4	Simulations	132
5.4.1	Introduction	132
5.4.2	First-best analysis	137
5.4.3	Second-best analysis	140
5.4.4	Summary	142
5.5	Conclusions	143
	Appendix to chapter 5: Non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium	153
6	Tradeable permits and coordination of environmental policy in a second-best world	155
6.1	Introduction	155
6.2	The model	156
6.3	Simulations of the Nash-bargaining equilibrium	159
6.4	Summary of the simulation results	162
6.5	The institutional setting	164
6.5.1	Taxes	164
6.5.2	Tradeable permits: national system	165
6.5.3	Tradeable permits with auctioning: an international system	169
6.6	Conclusions	176
	Appendix to chapter 6: Two-stage permit game	185
7	Conclusions	189
	Samenvatting	196
	Bibliography	203

## STELLINGEN

- 1 Een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten is een uitvoerbaar, efficiënt en effectief instrument voor het terugdringen van de CO<sub>2</sub> emissies.
- 2 Een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten kan in theorie de toetreding van nieuwe bedrijven belemmeren, maar in praktijk zal dit effect beperkt zijn.
- 3 De nuttigste besteding van het geld dat beschikbaar is voor milieu-onderzoek is een studie naar het milieurendement van deze uitgaven.
- 4 Complexiteit is geen rechtvaardiging voor een gebrek aan creativiteit.
- 5 De belastingverhogingen die Diocletianus (Romeins Keizer van 284 tot 305 AD) heeft ingevoerd om de Romeinse legioenen te versterken zijn één van de oorzaken van de uiteindelijke militaire ondergang van het Romeinse rijk.
- 6 Het standaard-gebruik om verschillende single cask malt whisky's samen te voegen, is een verspilling.
- 7 Binnen de Europese Unie hoeft men niet bevreesd te zijn voor een culturele eenheidsworst, omdat regionale specialiteiten het lekkerst smaken in de regio van produktie.
- 8 Invoering van het Latijn als enige officiële taal in de Europese Unie is de historisch meest verantwoorde oplossing voor het talenprobleem in de Unie.
- 9 Het schrijven van een dissertatie is geen monnikenwerk, indien men bij het werk begeleid wordt door Gregoriaanse muziek.

Paul Koutstaal

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