
Part I Protracted Failure: the Russian Military and the Concept of the Post-Modern All-Volunteer Force

'When sufficient knowledge of a system is lacking, reform typically gets bogged down in an interplay of action and reaction in which gradually suffocates all desire for change.'

(Crozier and Friedberg: *Actors & Systems*, p. 232)

Introduction

The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the debates surrounding the professionalization of the Russian armed forces, which took place during the Gorbachev era (1988-1992) in Soviet Russia and the Yeltsin era (1992-1999) in post-Soviet Russia. The attempts that were made by the political and military elites to become a post-modern military organization were fraught with problems and the often stated aim of full professionalization was never achieved. Thus, this thesis investigates what these problems were and why they occurred. I propose that political, institutional, and cultural factors to a significant, if not decisive degree prevented the Russian military to become a post-modern All-Volunteer Force. In order to examine or to test this hypothesis, I have summarized the literature on this topic which includes: firstly political science theories on the nature of bureaucracy which takes into account the factors that affect change in a bureaucratic organization and secondly, the social, political and historical writings on Russia and its military organization and other military organizations in general. Through this analysis it is possible to see that the failure to fully professionalize the Russian military was not, as often thought, primarily an economic problem but it was the result of a combination of factors.¹³

In order to examine what these factors were and how they are inter-related to one another, an analytical framework is constructed which will guide the structure of the dissertation. This framework is based on a sociological model that focuses on the agents and processes involved in (military) organizational change on the one hand and on 'ideal models' (or 'developmental constructs') which provide its conceptual referents, on the other.¹⁴ The

¹³ In order to prevent conceptual confusion, it is necessary to state that throughout this thesis the concepts of 'professionalization' and the 'all-volunteer force' are used as synonyms of the 'post-modern' variant of these ideas. For reasons of style, fluency and eloquence, the adjective of post-modernity is sometimes omitted in this text, while it is always the purpose to indicate the post-modern military organization. This thesis is in its essence a study of the development (or better the non-development) of the post-modern military organization in the Russian Federation! In the second chapter of this part, it will be explained in detail what is exactly meant with the post-modern military organization.

¹⁴ The idea of a 'developmental construct' was proposed by the American political scientist Harold Lasswell in the 1930's in his famous article on the 'Garrison State' in which he intended to 'posit an ideal-type at some future point by which past and present trends can be identified and appraised.' See: Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Garrison State', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, January 1941, pp. 455-457; and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.7. Lasswell's method may counter in some ways the critique of 'presentism' (in German: 'hineininterpretierung') often exclaimed by historians who say that (sociological) explanations are based on *ex post facto* analysis and have 'a tendency to read history and social reality backwards, measuring change over time from the point of arrival rather than the point of departure'. See on this last point Leon Aron, *Yeltsin, A Revolutionary Life*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 697.

sociological model used throughout this study is an operationalized, yet a simplified 'construction' of reality based on personal choices. This model sheds a particular light on military organizational evolution, in general, and on the idea of the professionalization of the armed forces in a post-industrial society, in particular. Subsequently this model is useful because it is capable of describing and explaining key aspects of military organizational change. The use of ideal models, as the principle tools of comparison, forms the fundamental method of analysis in this study. In this respect, the Western experience of professionalizing the armed forces, and the academic discourse associated with it, is both implicitly and explicitly used as a means of comparison with the Russian case.

The purpose of Part I of the dissertation is two-fold. Firstly, an analytical model, addressing change in the military organization and the professionalization of the armed forces in its specific, post-modern environment is developed and explained. This model, which is called 'the triad model of organizational change', is developed from and built upon the Western literature of military sociology and is illustrated by drawing upon the experiences of three European countries: France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. These countries were selected because they decided to introduce the 'zero draft' system of recruitment in the 1990's.¹⁵ Secondly, the structural crisis in Russian manpower policy is defined and explained using this analytical framework. In this manner the main research question of this study, as it is outlined in the introduction of this thesis, is expanded into greater detail and placed into the proper Russian context.

¹⁵ An implicit goal of the proposed model is to expand the intuitive knowledge of the concept of the 'professional'naia armiiia' through the sociological (post-modern) reading of it, especially for a Russian audience. In several contacts with Russian activists (but also Russian military professionals) it was observed that they never approached the military organization in this way. The purpose is to accept Crozier's and Friedberg's advice, saying that: 'if action is based on adequate knowledge of the context, it can go with the system rather than against it, thus economizing on resources which are inevitably scarce and improving outcome' (Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, *Actors and Systems, The Politics of Collective Action*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 233). The model was proposed several times before Russian audiences by the author: Joris Van Bladel, 'Professional'naia armiiia budushchego I zakat massovoi armii post-sovremennaia organizatsiia, sotsiologicheskie aspekty' [The Professional Army of the future and the Decline of the Mass Army The post-Modern Military Organization, some Sociological Aspects], in: Elena Vilenskaia and Ella Poliakova (editors), *Materialy seminarov 'V XXI vek bez nasiliia [Proceedings of seminars 'To the XXI Century without Violence']*, St-Petersburg, 15-17 May 1998, St.-Petersburg: Tyskarora, 1998, pp. 16-23; and in a modified form in, Joris Van Bladel, 'The logic of the decline of the modern mass army and the rise of a post-modern all-volunteer force', in: John Lough and Tatiana G. Parchalina (editors), *The First Anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act: Appraisal and Outlook, Documents on the International Conference, 19-20 June 1998*, Moskva: INION RAN, 1999, pp. 138-149.

Chapter 1. Change in Military Organizations: a Conceptual Framework

The process of reform of a complex organization such as the Russian military can be understood in two ways, one may take either a specific political perspective; or a broader, sociological approach. Reform in the narrow sense of the word is the result of political and managerial decision-making, which includes: the conceptualization of ideas for reform, the process of decision-making, and the implementation of the proposed reform itself. This approach is typically a 'top-down' interpretation based on the assumption that reform is a consciously controlled process which can actively intervene in and alter social reality. In this context reform means the realm of official plans for reform, of which 'Russia' saw at least six since 1989. However, the study of reform as a strictly political and managerial activity can be misleading. The attempt to reform military institutions in the West showed, for instance, that notwithstanding the relatively benign political circumstances and the availability of sophisticated management skills, it has consistently proven to be an extremely complex and difficult process to undertake. Moreover, the Russian experience has shown that military reform has not been governed by a clear and coherent time frame.¹⁶ The complexity, the ambiguity, and even haphazardness of military reform suggest that there is a need in the field to complement the narrow view of military reform with a broader understanding of social change. Social change is a complex and diffuse concept; which is the result of a multi-dimensional process on which active and passive factors (or 'actors' and 'systems') simultaneously intervene. This process is, as the Russian military historian, Mark von Hagen, wrote, "an interplay between objective and subjective factors, or the interaction among structural, conjunctural, and eventual aspects of the historical process."¹⁷

Both the political and the sociological perspectives shed light on complementary processes and both are therefore necessary elements in the study of military organizational change. If the sociological interpretation itself tempers somewhat the illusion of omnipotent managerial decisions being made, this study never denies that the political process itself is an indispensable constituent of organizational change. Politics, the arena of state power and power-wielding actors, determine the timing and the tempo of reform in the short run. Ultimately, politics decide whether organizational change is a genuine requirement or merely a looming option at any point in time. Notwithstanding this, the *longue durée* and the impersonal, structural, and cultural processes of reform do matter because they delineate or construct the environment in which politics take place. For example, the ways that individuals act in an organization and interact with the broader environment is explained in detail in the first section of Chapter 1.

The second section of this chapter shows how these general processes affect the military organization in general, and in particular, the idea of professionalization. Therefore, a dual 'politico-social' interpretation, as suggested above, of the concept of professionalization is provided. In narrow terms the position of the professional soldier can be seen as the result of day-to-day political decisions. The professional soldier becomes in this sense simply a volunteer soldier who is paid for his survival. In broader terms, the professional soldier can be understood as the ultimate result of a complex process of environmental influences, which is also called 'the process of modernization'. Seen in this way, the professionalization of the

¹⁶ Stephen White alluded to this in his study of Soviet-Russian governmental campaigns against alcoholism. See: Stephen White, *Russia Goes Dry, Alcohol, State and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 176-189.

¹⁷ Mark von Hagen, *Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-1930*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 4.

armed forces can be understood as a project of modernization, which is related with more fundamental and more difficult to change concepts such as 'mentality' and 'culture'. The latter, complex meaning of professionalization in the armed forces is the main subject of the second section.

Finally, in the third section of this context-setting chapter, the experience of the professionalization of the armed forces will be briefly illustrated. The continental experience of Belgium, France and the Netherlands will serve as examples but not as models. These experiences demonstrate two universal problems: one is the consistently problematic nature of military reform; the other is that professionalization has a 'national specific' character. Donna Winslow warns us in her study of the Canadian military, that the process of organizational change is never "a linear, chronological, or coherent process".¹⁸ These examples should remind the reader that, contrary to the widely held view that the Western experience of military reform was an unequivocal, smooth success story, in reality it revealed both successes and failures. The experiences of the three countries provide examples of how the 'zero draft' was introduced in the 1990s in a post-industrial society, and is an important reference point to which the reality of Russian military reform can be compared.

1. 1. Change in Complex Organizations

Organizational change is fundamentally the result of a decision-making process, which confront the institutional interests and beliefs that exist within a turbulent, broader environment. Organizational change is the point where 'structure' and 'actor' meet. Therefore the key elements of this study are the actor, the organization and the environment which are all guided by their own logic. These three elements create what is called the 'triad model of organizational change'. In reality they form a complex interacting triad whose constituent elements are difficult to separate and disentangle. Each of these elements requires further explanations and clarification of how they are interpreted and how they are related to each other.

The Rational Actor

An actor is portrayed as a 'social entity'- an individual or a corporate actor- who acts rationally in his/her/its relationship with the organization and the social environment beyond the boundaries of the organization. In his/her/its struggle with the environment, the actor builds a strategy which Crozier and Friedman have called a 'rational strategy'.¹⁹ Based on their empirical study, they attribute the following characteristics to the actor. Firstly, the actor rarely has clear objectives and, even more rarely, coherent projects instead the actor's objectives are diverse, more or less ambiguous, more or less explicit, and more or less contradictory. Secondly, the individual's behavior is nevertheless active. While the actor is always constrained and limited, his/her behavior is never directly determined. Thirdly, the behavior in question is always meaningful. Not only is the actor rational in terms of the objectives pursued, (s)he is also rational in respect to other opportunities which appear and their respective defining contexts on the one hand, and on the other hand to other actors' behavior, their decisions, and the ensuing 'game' between them. Fourthly, this behavior

¹⁸ Donna Winslow, *Le Régiment Aéroporté du Canada en Somalie, Une enquête socio-culturelle [The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, A Socio-Cultural Survey]*, Ottawa: Ministre des Travaux Publics et Services Gouvernementaux Canada, 1997, p. 11.

¹⁹ Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, *Actors and Systems, The Politics of Collective Action*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 24-25.

always has two aspects: offensive (which involves exploiting opportunities in order to improve the actors' situation); and defensive (involving the actors' maintenance and broadening of their liberty (freedom of maneuver) and therefore their capacity to act). Finally, according to Crozier and Friedman, there is no such thing as purely irrational behavior. The very utility of the concept of strategy is that it applies equally to behavior which seems the most rational and to that behavior which appears to be completely erratic. The analyst can discover regularities which make sense only relative to a strategy. Hence strategy is nothing other than the inferred basis *ex post facto* for the empirically observed regularities of behavior. It follows that any such 'strategy' is in no way synonymous with willed behavior, any more than it is necessarily conscious.²⁰

The words 'rationality' and 'rational', as mentioned in the fifth point, must be treated with caution. They are sociological concepts not psychological or ethical notions. The idea of the 'rational actor', as a constitutive element of social change, allows for the explanation of social phenomena. It does not make an assertion of an actor's mental state nor the appropriateness of his/her actions. Stating that an individual is 'rational' is completely different from saying that he is intelligent or wise.²¹ Moreover, as noted in the first point, it is not because an actor in an organization acts 'rationally' that the overall result of his action is 'rational'. The phenomenon of the perverse, unintended effects of rational behavior is well known in social sciences. It was even noted by R. K Merton as early as 1936.²² Crozier and Friedberg recommend looking to the actors' perceived opportunities and his/her relation with his/her co-actors, rather than his/her objectives. This is crucial to this thesis.

In conclusion, this section has shown that an actor's behavior is perceived as an expression and consequence of freedom, no matter how limited that freedom may be.²³ Moreover, it reflects choices made by the actor to take advantage of available opportunities within the framework of constraints imposed upon him/her. Change is thus an essential task for which an actor has to find solutions.²⁴

²⁰ This last element of 'rational behavior' is also described by Anthony Giddens when he cited the work of Erving Goffman: 'It is my belief that any group of persons, primitives, pilots or patients, develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable, and normal once you get close to it... It indicates that what looks 'insane' to an outside observer is not quite so irrational when seen in the context of the hospital...As a consequence, they develop patterns of behaviour which seem bizarre to the outsider, but were understandable attempts to cope with the unusual demands of their environment.' (Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993 (Second Edition), pp. 684-685.). An applied study on the military that illustrates this point can be found in: Charles C. Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, pp. 64-77.

²¹ The notion of the rational actor is often misinterpreted and is the cause of much misunderstanding. 'Rationality' in this study is stripped from every ethical or normative notion. As will be explained in the chapter of the soldiers' question, scientific analysis and political activism, ethics and management, reflection and action all find themselves in a very difficult inter-relationship.

²² R.K. Merton, 'The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 1936, pp. 894-904.

²³ Thus, although to a Russian soldier his freedom may intuitively seem to be almost non-existent, and whatever the outsider intuitively may say about it, his behavior is the result of freedom and choice! An affirmation can be found in Erving Goffman's well known study of a mental hospital (as an example of closed, public institutions). Even in the strict organized and disciplined life as a mental hospital, Goffman found out that the members 'employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the organization's assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence what he should be' (See: Erving Goffman, 'The Underlife of a Public Institution: a Study of Ways of Making Out in a Mental Hospital', in: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller, *The Sociology of Organizations, Basic Studies*, New York: The Free Press, 1981 (Second Edition), pp. 280-302.)

²⁴ For Crozier and Friedberg change is never a 'normal', natural thing: 'It is not the consequence of a supra-individual logic, which may be of an economic, ecological, biological, cultural, or a moral order. These factors may however influence change, but assuming that change is a problem of man does not determine his response to these influences, nor does it imply that he will respond in any way at all.' (Crozier and Friedberg, *Op. Cit.*, p.

The Complex Organization

In the 'triad-model' a basic assumption is that the actor cannot be isolated from the organization in which (s)he acts. It is obligatory to see the actor's strategy in connection with the organization itself. Seen in terms of the strategy of several actors, the organization is in fact a realm of power relationships, influence, bargaining, and calculation. As a result, an actor's rationality can only be understood in the context of his/her relationship with the wider organization. Therefore, the concept of the organization must be outlined and understood.

In this study, an actor's organizational environment is acknowledged as a 'complex organization'. The characteristics of a complex organization are its boundaries; its large size; its high degree of structural differentiation (hierarchy); its high degree of functional differentiation (division of labor); the existence of a system of co-ordinating activities; the existence of rules and procedures which prescribe the responsibilities of all members of the organization; the existence of a network of complex communication; the fact of being an 'open' organization; and the existence of coalitions as constituent elements of the complex organization.²⁵ The first seven traits are descriptive and do not need further explanation. The last two characteristics are rather interpretations of how organizations function. Crucially, the assumption of an 'open' organization and the coalition hypothesis link the concepts of the 'complex organization' and the 'rational actor'. Following Crozier's fourth point, an actor's strategy is based on adapting to opportunities and the relation with the co-actors, forcing the actor (in the offensive aspect of his strategy) to exploit the organization; while urging him (in the defensive aspect of his strategy) to build coalitions. This relationship requires a closer examination of the 'open organization' and the 'organization as a coalition'.

The Complex Organization as an Open Organization. The open organization hypothesis postulates that there is an interdependence and exchange between the organization and its environment. As a result, boundaries are flexible and permeable.²⁶ This interpretation, especially as studied in 'contingency theory', emphasizes that an organization's successful adaptation to the environment is dependent on the ability of the top leadership to interpret the conditions confronting them appropriately and to adopt solutions.²⁷ The degree to which the organization is effective depends on achieving either a balance or compatibility between strategy, structure, technology, the commitments and needs of people, and the external environment. As noted above, this ability must be related to an actor's strategy.

213) This view of the actor and his place in the system has far-reaching consequences on the perception of the Russian military organization. It means that organizational change in the Russian military can never be qualified as a failure. The perception of a failure of reform is a political interpretation. Change for the sociologist is a difficult process of adaptation based on decisions of the managers, say the high command and political decision makers. Although the outcomes may seem to be awkward and even puzzling, for the planners decisions are always rational. An important task is therefore to understand the rational logic of the high command (in relation with the political management). The insights of Crozier and Friedberg are an important tool to obtain this goal.

²⁵ See for instance Philippe Manigart, *Les forces armées belges en transition, une analyse sociologique*, [The Belgian Armed Forces in Transition: a Sociological analysis] Brussels: Paul Didier Publisher, 1985, p. 1.

²⁶ The problem of organizational boundaries is a subject of debate. Some authors speak about 'blurred boundaries' and even the non-existence of boundaries. (See: Richard Scott. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 179-206) Joseph Soeters in his inaugural speech on the Dutch Royal Military Academy paid attention to this subject. J. Soeters, *Verschuivende en Vergruizende Grenzen, Over de doordringbaarheid van organisaties (met toepassing op de krijgsmacht)* [Moving and Pounding boundaries, On the Permeability of Organizations (applied to the Armed Forces)], Breda: Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1994. In the context of this study, however, the organization in general and the military organization can be distinguished from its environment.

²⁷ Concerning the 'Contingency Theory', see W. Richard Scott, *Organizations, Rational, Natural and Open Organizations*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981, pp. 113-115; and Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organizations*, London: Sage Publications, 1986, pp. 48-56.

The concept of the 'open organization' contrasts with that of the 'closed organization'. Given the importance of the closed organization concept in the study of the Russian army, it is essential to clarify this type of organization as well. Indeed, many organizational problems of the Russian military –as for instance constrained human relations between officers and soldiers and among soldiers themselves or the troubled civil-military relations in Russia - can be attributed to the confrontation between the open versus closed concepts. The different ways that people think about organizations can itself demonstrate how organizations are run (and vice versa). Organizational theory and organizational practice are interrelated phenomena, which are in turn culturally and historically conditioned. Before the 1960's organizations were merely studied as closed systems. They were perceived to be on their own, with their own internal logic with no external influences. In this tradition, organizational change was seen as precipitated by and directed from inside. Change was thought to be either the result of rational leadership or natural processes inside the organization. Richard Scott categorized these two sub-currents as 'rational' and 'natural' organizations.²⁸ The *rational (mechanic) organization* is a type of organization perceived as a collective deliberately designed to attain well-defined and stable goals.²⁹ It refers to a series of actions that are formally organized and which lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency. In other words, rational theorists underline goal specificity and formalization. The *natural (organic) type of organization* is constructed as a reaction against the rational organization. It accentuates the informal and spontaneous processes in the organization. Natural organizations are therefore collectivities as such. They stress problems of communication, leadership and job satisfaction in the organization.

For the purpose of this study it is important to develop the idea of the rational organization. This type of organization has its intellectual origin during the end of the Nineteenth Century and the first half of the Twentieth Century. As organizational theory co-evolved with the practice of management, a specific set of managerial principles was invented. The manager's basic problem was essentially one of quantity: how could the complexity of a large and expanding organization be managed? The period under discussion was, indeed, characterized by phenomena such as massive industrialization, mass and mechanized production. In response to these problems in the industrial sector, Frederick Taylor developed the theory of scientific management in 1911.³⁰

The basic thrust of **scientific management** is captured in the idea that management is a process of planning, organization, command, co-ordination and control. The result of this idea is a kind of organization represented in the familiar organization chart: a pattern of precisely defined jobs organized in a *hierarchical* manner through precisely defined lines of command and communication. Job responsibilities interlock so that they complement each other as perfectly as possible, and they are linked together through the scalar chain of command expressed in the classical dictum '*one man - one boss*'. The organization is made to operate as precisely as possible through patterns of *authority*. Patterns of authority serve as points of resistance and co-ordinate activities by restricting activity in certain directions while encouraging it in others.

By giving detailed attention to patterns of authority and to the general process of *direction, discipline, and subordination of individual to general interest*, the scientific

²⁸ Richard Scott, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 57-101.

²⁹ The adjective 'rational' here refers to the structure of the organization and may not be confused with the concept of 'rational actor'.

³⁰ Frederick W. Taylor, 'Scientific Management', in: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller, *The Sociology of Organizations, Basic Studies*, New York: The Free Press, 1981 (Second Edition), pp. 55-67; Gareth Morgan, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 29-33.

management theorist tried to ensure that when commands were issued from the top of the organization they would travel throughout the organization in a precisely determined way, to create a precisely determined effect. Blind obedience was therefore the assumed attitude of the workers who were not supposed to participate in the decision-making process. In other words, 'brain' and 'hands' were strictly divided and there was a high degree of centralization.³¹ Taylor, the founder of scientific management, advocated five principles.³²

1. Shift all responsibilities for the organization of work from the worker to the manager.
2. Use scientific methods to determine the most efficient way of doing work, design the worker's task accordingly, specify the precise way in which the work is to be done.
3. Select the best person to perform the job.
4. Train the worker to do the work efficiently.
5. Monitor work performance to ensure that appropriate work procedures are followed and that appropriate results are achieved.

Max Weber also presented his well-known ideal model of the **bureaucratic organization** at the turn of the Twentieth Century.³³ This was no coincidence, as many characteristics of Weber's theoretical bureaucratic ideal model corresponds with Taylor's practical management principles. Nohria and Berkley summarized the bureaucratic organization thus.³⁴

1. A discrete set of "jurisdictional areas" separate and regulated spaces pertaining to clearly differentiated functions within an enterprise;
2. A hierarchy consisting both of the subordination of offices and of individuals, with a resulting separation of levels of planning and execution;
3. A management system based on written documents or files and on a staff of people who maintain and transmit these files;
4. An exclusive focus on the organizational roles specific to particular offices, so as to create a neutral, impersonal environment;
5. A stress on technical training, with the use of technical criteria for matters of both recruitment and promotion;
6. An office system comprised of general rules, which are stable, thorough, and learnable.

The ideas of Weber and Taylor must be seen as part of a much broader social trend involving the mechanization and rationalization of life in general.³⁵ Taylor provided his era with a method to manage a large group of people performing a specific job in favor of the detailed goals stipulated by the organization. Therefore, 'Taylorism' and the bureaucratic organization serve as benchmarks for the understanding of organizational life in the first half of the Twentieth Century. They are the outcomes of thinking about organization as closed rational entities.

For a long time, the principles of Taylor, as well as the Weberian insights into the bureaucratic organization, were generally seen as the most effective mode of organization. However, during the second half of the Twentieth Century, flaws in the concept became

³¹ It is interesting to remark that in the field of psychology the school of behaviorism reigns in the period of scientific management. The basic idea of behaviorism is that human behavior is the learned response to specific stimuli. Human behavior can be conditioned by punishing wrong behavior and rewarding good behavior. This remark will be referred to when the relations between officers and soldiers in Russian barracks are described.

³² Gareth Morgan, *Op. Cit.*, 1997, p. 23.

³³ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, New York: Bedminster, 1968; Max Weber, 'Bureaucracy', in: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller, *Op. Cit.* pp. 7-36.

³⁴ Nitin Nohria and James Berkley, 'The Virtual Organization, Bureaucracy, Technology and the Implosion of Control', in: Charles Heckscher and Anne Donnellon (Eds.), *The Post-Bureaucratic Organization, New Perspectives on Organizational Change*, London: Sage Publications, 1994, p. 111.

³⁵ This will be explained and elaborated on further in the discussion of the environment affecting organizations.

apparent, and criticisms of the bureaucratic concept were formulated.³⁶ One of the most profound criticisms was the idea of 'Rigidity Cycles', stipulated by Michel Crozier, wherein cyclic crises were created in 'bureaucratic phenomena' by a 'bureaucratic vicious circle'.³⁷ This hinged on two ideas: first, the top management always tries to both retain and maximize its power and avoids external control (the so-called 'bureaucratization of leadership'). Secondly, each department of an organization attempts to hold onto its status, which results in the 'bureaucratization of offices'. Such a system suffers sclerosis caused by the contradictory impulses of each tier. The end result is an immobile and static organization which Crozier and Friedman called the 'non-organization'.³⁸

Confronted with two inter-linked problems - an increasingly dysfunctional hierarchical organization type and the profound and ever faster rate of change in the external environment - analysts looked for a different perspective. Despite the considerable 'consensus' about the obsolescence of the established bureaucratic type, a new ideal type for the post-bureaucratic organization incorporating a new set of management principles had still not been unequivocally created. In the context of this study, an attempt to define a post-bureaucratic ideal type is presented and both the 'virtual' and 'matrix' organizations are introduced as solutions to bureaucratic and managerial problems.

However, before the discussion of the organization types and management principles of the post-1960 period, it is necessary to emphasize the demands which underlie the profound changes in organizational theory. For example, one of the key elements of the changes was the re-(e)valuation of human resources in the organization. The role of personnel within the organization took on a new meaning. This had significant consequences for inter-human relations. This 'humanization' is in no way an outcome of a moral decision whatsoever, but a decision based on considerations of organizational efficiency and survival. The new way of thinking about man, organization and society is therefore in no way morally better than the Nineteenth Century way of thinking. At most, it can be stated that it is more an adapted answer to the challenges of a new era. These challenges are discussed later in the analysis of the wider environment in which actors operate. For the time being, it is sufficient to state that the environment urges the manager to stress quality more than quantity. The managerial environment is very unstable and determined by the outcomes of the technological revolution, what the futurologist Alvin Toffler called 'the Third Wave'.³⁹

In an attempt to create a post-modern ideal bureaucratic model that can be used like Weber's ideal model, Charles Heckscher stated that **the post-bureaucratic organization** is based on the following eleven ideas.⁴⁰

1. Consensus is created through institutionalized *dialogue* not through acquiescence to authority, rules, or traditions.
2. Dialogue is defined by the use of *influence* rather than power and peoples' decisions are affected by *persuasion* rather than relying on commands or orders.
3. Influence depends initially on *trust*, on the belief that all members seek mutual benefit rather than maximizing personal gain. In other words *interdependence* is essential.⁴¹

³⁶ There is an abundant literature on this issue. Influential books on this subject are: Michel Crozier, *Le Phénomène Bureaucratique [The Bureaucratic Phenomenon]*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963; Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, especially pp. 158-166. Charles Heckscher, 'Defining the Post-Bureaucratic Type', in: Charles Heckscher and Anne Donnellon (Editors), *The Post-Bureaucratic Organization, New Perspectives on Organizational Change*, London: Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 19-24.

³⁷ Michel Crozier, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 247-274.

³⁸ Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, *Op. Cit.*, p. 182.

³⁹ Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *The Third Wave*, New York: Bantam, 1980.

⁴⁰ Adapted from: Charles Heckscher, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 25-28.

4. There is a strong emphasis on *organizational mission* rather than universalistic statements of values. Employees therefore need to understand the key objectives in depth in order to coordinate their actions intelligently.
5. There is widespread *sharing of information* and there is an attempt to make conscious the connection between individual jobs and the mission of the whole. 'Brain' and 'hands' are not separate entities anymore but complementary. Individuals can break free from the boundaries of their 'defined' jobs and must think creatively and cooperatively about improvements.
6. The focus on the mission is to be supplemented by guidelines which are *principles* rather than rules. Principles are more *abstract* and *express the reasons behind the rules* that are typical of bureaucracy.
7. Influence relations are fluid, which means that decision-making processes must be frequently reconstructed. Authority can not be directly read from an organization chart.
8. Influence relations are wider and more diverse but also shallower and more specific, than those of traditional "community". It is a matter of 'knowing who to go to', rather than a matter of building a stable network of friendship relations.
9. It is a relatively open system at the boundaries. There is far more *tolerance* for outsiders coming in and for insiders going out.
10. There is an effort to *reduce rules* and concomitantly an increased pressure to *recognize the variety of individual performances*.
11. There is an expectation of constant change, and therefore the organization attaches time frames in order to adapt to the unstable environment. In an extremely unstable, ever changing environment, the manager must be able to manage different time frames.

As noted above, the two organization types which can be derived from this post-bureaucratic ideal model are the virtual organization and the matrix organization:

Nohria and Berkley have attributed the following basic features to **the virtual organization**⁴²:

1. The disappearance of material files and the reappearance of them in flexible and electronic form by means of information technology;
2. The replacement of face-to-face communications with computer-mediated communication, and a concomitant increase in the role of informal face-to-face communication for purposes of maintaining organizational coherence;
3. The transfer of issues of organizational structure from the realm of the organization of human beings to the organization of information and technology in such a way that the functioning of the organization appears spontaneous and paradoxically structure-less, while the functioning of information systems seems at once all-pervasive and faintly magical;
4. The networking of individuals from technically separate firms to the extent that clear boundaries of the organization become difficult to establish in practice;
5. The implosion of bureaucratic specialization into 'global', cross-functional, computer-mediated jobs, to such an extent that individual members of the organization may be considered holographically equivalent to the organization as a whole.

⁴¹ The importance of trust in society is also emphasized by Francis Fukuyama, who devoted a book to this subject: Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that Theo Dilissen, manager of the year 2001 in Belgium, revealed the following strategy to explain his success: 'team, transparency and trust.' It is no coincidence that Theo Dilissen is the manager of *Real Software*, a high tech company.

⁴² Nitin Nohria and James Berkley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 115.

Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky have given another less technological interpretation of the virtual corporation.⁴³ In their view, this type of organization seeks to push as many routine functions outside the boundaries of its own organization as possible. Consequently, one of the by-products of this trend is a general downsizing and breaking up of large integrated corporations. Companies examine all of their activities and decide which constitute 'core competencies' where they are 'best in the world'. Everything else ought to be out-sourced to some other firm that is 'best in the world' for the production of a good or service. For Stoner and others, the virtual organization is a temporary network of companies that come together quickly to exploit fast-changing opportunities.⁴⁴ The companies involved share costs, skills and access to global markets, with each partner contributing what it is best at. The key attributes for these kinds of organizations are: high technology, opportunism, excellence, trust, and temporary boundaries.

Stoner and others state that the **matrix organization** is based on multiple authority and support systems.⁴⁵ This means that there are two lines of authority: one running vertically (by functional department) and another running horizontally. As a result every matrix contains three unique sets of relationships: the senior manager who heads up and balances dual lines of authority; project managers, or team specialists, who share subordinates; and subordinates who report to two different managers (their department head and the project manager). This type of organization allows employees from different functional departments to pool their skills when solving a common problem. It aims at increasing the organization's ability to use human resources wisely and adapt to a changing environment. It ensures flexibility and cooperation at all levels of the organization. Therefore it thrives on open, direct lines of communication. Managers and subordinates need special training to learn new skills. Thus, it is an organization which is characterized by a strongly competitive environment, an enormous flow of information, rapid (if not instant) change, and is an entity in which resources are limited as cost efficiency is paramount.

At this point, a few words need to be said about downsizing because it coincides with the rise of the post-modern organization and is a feature of the conscript to professional debate in military reform.⁴⁶ Downsizing has a quantitative aspect, which simply means making the corporation smaller and leaner. During a period of corporate downsizing, managers and subordinates are encouraged to work in a manner which is based on cooperation, flexibility, expertise and trust.

A one-dimensional understanding of the downsizing process as a procedure which simply expels people from a company is only a part of the managerial and organizational revolution. Such expulsions are a characteristic misreading of organizational redesign. Therefore, downsizing has as much more to do with the 'flattening' of the organization as with the idea of making it smaller. The corporation shrinks vertically as well as horizontally. In sum, the open versus closed view of organization embedded in an historical framework can be presented in the following chart:

⁴³ Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky, *The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997, pp. 14-16.

⁴⁴ James Stoner, Edward Freeman and Daniel Gilbert, *Management*, London: Prentice-Hall, 1995 (Sixth Edition), p. 336.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.333-334; See also: Jay R. Galbraith, 'Matrix Organization Designs: How To Combine Functional and Project Forms', *Business Horizons*, Vol. 14, No 1, January-February 1971, pp. 29-40.

⁴⁶ See for instance: James Stoner, Edward Freeman and Daniel Gilbert, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 328-329 and directly applied to the Russian military organization: David Segal and others, *Downsizing the Russian Army: Quality of Life, and Mental Health, Consequences for Organizational Leavers, Survivors, and Spouses*, Paper presented at the international conference on Plant Closures and Downsizing in Europe, organized by the Higher Institute of Labor Studies, Catholic University Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, 28-29 January, 1999.

	Closed System	Open System
Period	1890-1950	1960 onward
Organizational type	Bureaucratic-traditional, hierarchic corporation	Post-Bureaucratic- Virtual and Matrix corporation
Management Philosophy	Taylorism	Human Resource Management

Table 1: Organizations as Closed versus Open Systems

Complex Organizations as Coalitions. The role that the rational actor plays in an attempt to fit into the rationally acting organization is another dimension of this type of organization. Indeed, complex organizations are not only considered as fundamentally open organizations, but also as collections of coalitions. Downs proposed that the idea of ‘coalitions’ differs from the concept of the ‘teams’.⁴⁷ He defined a team as a group of people working together who have identical goals. A coalition, however, is a group of people or a collective actor working together who have some common goals, but not all of their goals are common ones. The individual does not need to give his/her common goals the same relative weight in this individual preference structure. In this sense, organizational goals are the result of a compromise between the individual actors, and their individual calculations, bargaining skills, power relationships between individuals and the influence(s) of key persons in the organization. Thus, when all these factors are taken into account the organization is steered rationally through the calculated activity of the rational actor.

The Modernizing Environment

The third and last element of the triad model is the environment of the organization. In the case of the open organization type, it is self-evident that the environment of the organization matters. The environment, which influences complex organizations, is called the ‘modernizing society’. This term allows both the process of modernization and the state of modernity to be described simultaneously. A cluster of fundamental structural variables forms the ‘motor’ of the modernizing process.

The debate about which variables influence the process of modernization is a diffuse and incoherent discussion. Each author contributes a relative weight to a particular variable and sees a particular inter-relationship between the variables. Rather than explaining all the details of this academic discussion and evaluating the relative merits of each, we shall select a cluster of variables on which a broad agreement exists. These variables include the development of technology; the state of the economy; socio-cultural factors; and geo-political factors. The combination of these four principal variables makes up the organizational environment. Using these variables, three stages in the typology of society can be distinguished during the process of modernization: the pre-modern, the modern and the post-modern society. As the type of organizational change that is discussed in this thesis is profoundly molded by the modern society and troubled by the shift to the postmodern society, it is necessary to explain what sort of society the organization is acting in. Piotr Sztompka summarized the general organizing principles of modernity as⁴⁸:

1. *individualism* in which the individual receives a central role in society;
2. *differentiation* wherein there is a great degree of individual specialization and the growth of a staggering variety of options and concomitant choices;
3. *rationality* which tries to make the world predictable;

⁴⁷ Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, pp. 76-77.

⁴⁸ Piotr Sztompka, *The Sociology of Social Change*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996 (Second Edition), pp. 71-76.

4. *economism* by which is meant the dominance of economic activities, goals, criteria and achievements over all social life; and
5. *expansionism*, the idea that modernity has an inherent tendency to extend its reach in terms of space (geographically) and depth (in reaching the most detailed, private and intimate spheres of daily life).

A final aspect of modernity concludes this presentation of the triad model that constrains organizational change. Alex Inkeles describes the idea of the 'modern personality'.⁴⁹ This analytical model attributes characteristics to modern human beings and their mentality. From this discussion of the modern individual, this insight helps us to understand the idea of the professional soldier in the subsequent section. The following qualities were attributed by Inkeles to the modern man:

1. a readiness for new experience and openness to innovation and change;
2. a readiness to form or hold opinions and to recognize the diversity of existing opinions;
3. a specific orientation toward time: emphasis on the present and the future rather than the past. An acceptance of schedules, punctuality;
4. efficacy, which refers not only to potential mastery over the natural environment but also to potential control over problems arising in social life;
5. planning, anticipating and organizing future activities;
6. trust in the regularity and predictability of social life, allowing for calculability of actions;
7. the sense of distributive justice: the belief that rewards should accord to rule skill and contribution;
8. interest in formal education and schooling;
9. respect for dignity of others, including those of inferior status or power.

After the 1960's, especially in the West, many authors perceived an upcoming new world in which they saw qualitative mutations in society which they labeled the post-modern world.⁵⁰ Although the idea of modernization is controversial, it is adopted in this study to explain change in both complex and military organizations.⁵¹ Lyon's argument, in his discussion of the meaning and value of the concept of post-modernity, can be used to buttress this point of view:

⁴⁹ Alex Inkeles, 'A Model of the modern man: theoretical and methodological issues' in: Cyril Black, *Comparative Modernization*, New York: The Free Press, 1976, pp. 320-348.

⁵⁰ It is for this study unfruitful to discuss the problem of vocabulary. Some authors call the actual period the 'post-modern society', other scholars such as Anthony Giddens call it 'high modernity', while some others call it the 'post-industrial society'. What is important for this study is that the post-1960 world is a world which has developed and is developing into a fundamentally different type of society with a completely different logic than the industrial society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

⁵¹ On the theoretical side the following critique is formulated against the idea of modernization: (1) the underlying evolutionary assumption, namely the idea of one single track evolution, is found unacceptable; (2) the strict opposition of tradition and modernity is found misleading; (3) the importance of an external, global context and exogenous causation (the so-called convergency theory of Kerr) is overemphasized in place of an exclusive endogenous focus; (4) the regular sequence of stages in modernization is put into doubt and (5) the ethnocentric, western-oriented conception of the goals of modernization is questioned. See for this critique: Piotr Sztompka, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 135-136. The critique of Charles Tilly is especially worth mentioning. He claims that sociology is trapped in the assumptions deriving from the Nineteenth Century. Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984, p. 12.) Tilly's critique has many parallels with Robert Nisbet's remarks on this matter (See: Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 166.) and with the ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein (See: Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Sciences. The Limits of Nineteen-Century Paradigms*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.)

“...the concept of postmodernity is a valuable 'problematic' that alerts us to key questions concerning contemporary social changes. I see it as a concept that invites participation in a debate over the nature and direction of present-day societies, in a globalized context, rather than one describing an already existing state of affairs. Quite unprecedented social and cultural shifts are occurring; whether or not 'postmodernity' is the best term to sum them up is a moot point. The important thing is to understand what is happening, not to agree on a concept to capture it with. 'Postmodernity' will do fine for now.”⁵²

Thus due to the concomitant evolution of organizations, it may be clear that the complex organization discussed above is a product of the Twentieth Century. More precisely, the modern era was the environment in which the classic bureaucratic organization developed, whereas the virtual and matrix organization has developed within the environment of the post-modern society. This insight is summarized in the following table.

	Closed System	Open System
Period	1890-1950	1960 onward
Organizational type	Bureaucratic-traditional, hierarchic corporation	Post-Bureaucratic- Virtual and Matrix corporation
Management Philosophy	Taylorism	Human Resource Management
Organizational environment	Modern society	Post-Modern society

Table 2: Organizations as Closed versus Open Systems (Complement 1)

The Triad Model of Change in Organizations

In summary, the previous discussion can be graphically shown in the triad model of organizational change as follows (Figure I). The three key elements, the 'environment', 'the organization' and 'the actor' are represented as 'concentric' entities. Each element of the model of organization has an active and a passive component. In the environment, the active component is political practice (political decision-making through political institutions, and possibly the process of institution building itself). The passive component comprises the structural environmental factors that influence the organization. The organization is a 'complex organization' which is an 'open organization' based on coalitions. The ideal model of the bureaucratic organization as well as the 'virtual' and the 'matrix' organizations represent the passive component of the organization. Finally, the individual as a 'rational actor' is a component of the active interpretation of organizations. In contrast, the individual as represented in the ideal model of the 'modern personality' is a component of the passive interpretation. Hence, this 'triad' model is located in a central position in the 'actor-system' debate. It represents the modernization hypothesis as a heuristic model.

The complexity of this triad model as thus understood is schematized in Figure 1.

⁵² David Lyon, *Postmodernity, Concepts in the Social Sciences*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999, (second edition), p. 108.




Figure 1: The Triad Model

1. 2. Change in Military Organizations

Clark Kerr's convergence theory postulates that industrial societies become increasingly alike and evolve as a whole because the character of the dominant technology enforces specific forms of social organization, political life, cultural patterns, every day conduct and even beliefs and attitudes.⁵³ This idea can be used to show that military organizations are in the long run a reflection of state and society. Furthermore, the open organization hypothesis underscores the co-evolution between the military organization and society. These insights lay at the basis of military sociology as an applied field of sociology. The idea of organizational evolution presented here fits the approach outlined during the 1960s by Morris Janowitz (who is regarded as the founder of this applied field of military sociology). Janowitz hypothesized that there was a resemblance between the evolution of civilian organizations and military organizations. This is the so-called 'civilianization hypothesis' which James Burk describes as follows⁵⁴:

“The central argument was that the boundaries separating the military from civilian society had progressively weakened since the turn of the century. It described a military organization that was forced to participate more

⁵³ Mentioned in Piotr Sztompka, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 133-135.

⁵⁴ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: Free Press, 1971 (second edition), pp. xii-xv.

actively in the life of the larger society and yet maintain its relative autonomy, competence, and group cohesion.”⁵⁵

In addition Jacques Van Doorn noticed a qualitative mutation in the character of military organizations. In a seminal article on 'the decline of the mass army', Van Doorn argued that military organizations evolved from a modern mass-army to a professional army.⁵⁶ Janowitz's and Van Doorn's ideas were visionary at that time. When many of their postulated ideas were realized, other military sociologists expanded and refined the idea of the professional armed forces and they subsequently created the model of the post-modern army. Thus the evolving theoretical discourse on organizational change in business and government and the narrow discussion on military change are now comparable. In fact, the similarities between business and military organizations were not accidental: they are both affected by profound changes in the external environment.

In order to outline the ideal models of the modern and post-modern variants of military organizations, the environmental changes that precipitated the mass army and the post-modern All-Volunteer Force (AVF) will be reviewed. The structural variables presented above will be employed to examine what the logic or the pattern of military organizational change is and from this discussion typical characteristics of different military organizations types will be outlined.

Changing Environments

Environmental Aspects of the Mass Army. The 'mass army' is a type of military organization that developed during the French and American revolutions and this form of military organization prevailed until the end of the Second World War. The armies that fought in the First World War can be considered as archetypical mass army types. Mass armies were closely related to the development of the industrial society and as well to the notion of nationalism.⁵⁷ The growth of the industrial sector which was based on the production and use of sources of energy such as coal, steel and steam made mass production possible. Mass production in the weapons industry made it feasible to procure weapons for large armies. The development of a factory system and a refined division of labor in the textile industry, enabled the state to produce uniforms on a massive scale for the army. Finally, the development of the railway system, telecommunications and food industry allowed states to mobilize, transport and feed huge armies in a relatively efficient way.

The emerging nation state - 'the political consequence of modernity'⁵⁸ - was an essential element in the socio-cultural environment of mass armies. The nation-state was able to mobilize the whole community under the banner of nationalism. The state intervened directly and bluntly in the life of the individual citizen. Charles Tilly called this the imposition of the state's 'direct rule'.⁵⁹ In exchange for protection and increasing education the citizen had to be

⁵⁵ James Burk, 'Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.19, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 179.

⁵⁶ Jacques Van Doorn, 'The Decline of the Mass Army in the West: General Reflections', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1975, pp. 147-157. Although Van Doorn spoke instead of an all-volunteer force (AVF) and never used the terminology of post-modernity. However, the context, referents and form of argumentation used in the article render the interpretation possible.

⁵⁷ For a good overview see for instance: A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military*, New York: The Free Press, 1959; and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990*, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 96-126.

⁵⁸ Claus Offe, *Modernity and the State*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 61.

⁵⁹ Charles Tilly, *Op. Cit.*, 1990, pp. 103-117.

willing to perform military service. State nationalism was the myth that justified the practices of modern society:

“The essence of the mass army is only partly its size, although it is a great deal larger than most of its predecessors. The essence of the mass army is its ability to maintain its size in the face of the rigors of war: the attrition exacted by the unhealthy conditions of the campaign, the temptation of individuals to desert, and the firepower of the enemy.(...) Thus the recruits must arrive with a certain willingness to become soldiers, a certain educability [sic], and a certain commitment to the outcome of the battle. This makes political motivation, and ultimately literacy, key elements of the mass army. (...) The problem becomes how to keep these dispersed, scared, and lonely men risking their own lives, and cooperating to take the lives of others.”⁶⁰

Conscription was seen as an accomplishment of the French Revolution. Universal compulsory military service contributed to the democratization of society on three levels.⁶¹ The duty and the right to bear weapons was a totally new idea. It was perceived as a compulsory contribution of civil rights by the citizen. Moreover, the fact that conscription was supposed to be distributed equally over the male population meant that the introduction of compulsory conscription, a core characteristic of the mass army, can be seen as a contribution to the democratization of society. Finally, citizenship and military service were two narrowly related ideas. Military service made the individual take part in society. Rejection of military service excluded him from society. Janowitz remarked in this context that military service was the hallmark of citizenship as citizenship was the hallmark of political democracy⁶² and Tilly summarized it in another one-liner, ‘Militarization = civilianization’.⁶³

Frontiers and territory were important elements of the state during the Nineteenth Century and the threat of invasion was a primary concern of the state and its military organization(s). In addition, this period was characterized by the concept of total war in which the mobilization of the whole society was necessary to wage war. The concept of total war is embodied in Posen’s comment, “economy, education, culture... all this stood in the function of the preparation and waging of the next war.”⁶⁴ The military institution was consequently regarded as the most important institution in society, the *primus inter pares*, of the state’s agencies. Military organizations enjoyed a high level of esteem and resources were made readily available to them. The army was therefore an integral part of state nationalism. In contrast to the Nineteenth Century environmental characteristics, the world changed dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century.

Environmental Aspects of the Post-Modern Military. The first contours of the postmodern military appeared in the 1960's, but it was during the Gulf War of 1991 and different peacekeeping and peace-making actions in the 1990's which can be seen as prototypical for

⁶⁰ B. R. Posen, 'Nationalism, Mass Army, and Military Power', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 83-84.

⁶¹ See for instance: Charles Tilly, *Op. Cit.*, 1990, pp. 122-126 and James Burk, ‘Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious Objectors’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Summer 1995, pp. 503-529.

⁶² Morris Janowitz, *On Social Organization and Social Control*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 226-227.

⁶³ Charles Tilly, *Op. Cit.*, 1990, p. 122.

⁶⁴ B. R. Posen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 87.

this army type.⁶⁵ The post-modern variant of the military organization must be seen in the context of a fundamental change in the geopolitical situation in the world, rapid economic and technological changes, and changes in the world's populations' attitudes to war. This ever growing rapidity of change has made the organizational environment profoundly unstable. Instability and unpredictability are key characteristics to which the military organizations have had to find organizational answers.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union led to the break-up of the certainty and predictability of a bipolar international system. The new security era could be characterized as one of risk, complexity and uncertainty in comparison with the relative certainty of the preceding four decades. The outbreak of total war, already in doubt by the introduction of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, changed fundamentally.⁶⁶

Whereas deterrence was the core of the mission of the military organization during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a completely different scale and set of threats and missions. The missions were called 'missions other than war' or 'low intensity conflicts' and were against such threats as terrorism, organized crime, and local nationalism. Humanitarian aid, refugee support and aid in areas of natural disasters became part of military missions.

The rapid changes in the nature of the threats facing Western militaries, when deployed on a particular mission, were also a notable characteristic of the new geo-political environment. A good example is provided by British forces deployed in Macedonia during May-June 1999. During the NATO air campaign over Kosovo they prepared and trained initially for a full-scale ground war. But after Kosovar refugees flooded Macedonia and Albania they changed their mission and became a humanitarian force. Finally, after a peace agreement, they entered Kosovo with a peacekeeping mandate. Thus, in a time frame of two months, the missions of these elite troops changed fundamentally. The tempo and the nature of the changes possible in the post-modern military environment have urged the British forces to become both more flexible and better trained.

⁶⁵ It is important to remark that the transition from the 'mass army' to the 'post-modern' army type took considerable time and in fact passed over a third, specific (transitory) type army. This transitory type of army is called in the literature of military sociology the 'force-in-being' and was related with the idea that armies evolved to a 'constabulary force' rather than the traditional fighting force (See: Morris Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, 1971, p. li and pp. 417-442) Also Karl Haltiner stressed the transitory character in the evolution between the two extreme army types. Based on the quantitative variable 'Conscript Ratio', he stated that: 'the transition between the different types of force format is rather gradual, and the mass army format of the armed forces apparently rises *relatively continuously* in the transition from type 0 (all-volunteer systems) to type III (hard-core conscript systems [with a conscript ratio above 66%]' See: Karl W. Haltiner, 'The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Fall 1988, pp. 7-36. Charles Moskos made room for three periods in his famous post-modern typology, namely Early-Modern, Late-Modern and Postmodern periods. It implies also the 'force-in-being' idea. (See: Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in: James Burk (editor), *The Military in New Times, Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview press, 1994, p. 147 and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-2) In the less accurate, but more generally used notion -especially in Russia- of the 'mixed army' type, the idea of a transitory army type is also suggested. The mixed army type refers to the fact that recruitment is based on both, compulsory conscription and contract basis. Conventionally and for matters of analytical explicitness, this study limits itself to the dichotomy between the mass army and the post-modern army type. It is important to bear in mind that this is a simplification of historical and social reality, but nevertheless applicable to Russia.

⁶⁶ See for instance: Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society, Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 19-23 and pp. 64-105; J. van der Meulen, 'Civiel-militaire betrekkingen in verandering: wisselwerking tussen maatschappij en krijgsmacht', in: H. Born, R. Moelker and J. Soeters, *Krijgsmacht en samenleving: klassieke en eigentijdse inzichten, [Armed Forces and Society: Classic and Modern Views]*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, pp. 54-66.

Economically in the world today there is a trend towards globalization. Predominantly national markets have evolved into global markets. This increased competition combined with technological and information revolutions have made organizations less labor-intensive and more capital-intensive. As a result of globalization there has been a change from extensive to intensive growth, and the famous quantity-quality innovation has taken place. Firms have become smaller but their capacity and their ability to provide services have increased in inverse proportion.

These factors have also affected military organizations. The third industrial revolution, with computer technology as a key factor, allows armies to work with technological advanced weapons. This context has led to the so-called 'revolution in military affairs' with significant consequences, such as military organizations requiring on the one hand more and more highly trained personnel with higher educational qualifications; and on the other hand the least specialized military functions have begun to disappear because they can be automated or outsourced; and the training of these military specialists takes too long and is expensive.⁶⁷

The ideas of materialism and individualism have also grown to extreme levels in post-modern society.⁶⁸ Consequently, values and attitudes have evolved in the direction of 'self realization', consumerism and hedonism. The 'Welfare State' mechanism supports this situation as a safety net for those who cannot compete in this type of society. Within the overall societal dynamic people are no longer prepared to give up their privileges for reasons of state security. Carroll J. Glynn and others noted this in their paraphrase of Inglehart's ideas:

"In the United States and Western Europe, the general increase of prosperity over most of the twentieth century had profoundly altered the balance between materialist and postmaterialist values. Each new generation tended to be less concerned about materialistic values such as prosperity and security. Postmaterialist values-such as more say in government, a less impersonal society, and freedom of speech-gradually rose in importance."⁶⁹

In its attempt to cope with highly complex social problems, the state appears to be in crisis. It finds itself in a contradictory (post-modern) state of being too small and too big at the same time. On the one hand, states seem to be too large to cope with the individual problems of the increasingly demanding citizenry. On the other hand, given the growing trend of giving more authority to international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union, states are too small to handle classical state matters; and this perception is taking the efforts to create common defense (although political obstacles related to individual states' perceptions of their role in the world create stumbling blocks).

In this situation, the narrow relationship of citizenship and military services dominant in the modern era no longer exist. The status of the army changed dramatically. The allocated state resources for defense shrank proportionally and were re-allocated to what can be broadly called 'welfare matters'. The fall of the army's status, as an international phenomenon, can be explained by several interacting processes: the fundamental shift in state priorities in the 'post-

⁶⁷ D. M. Snow, *The Shape of the Future: the Post-Cold War World*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991; and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Op. Cit.*, 1993.

⁶⁸ See for example: Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution, Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977; and Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. For an application of this idea on the military organization see Fabrizio Battistelli, 'Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 467-484.

⁶⁹ Carroll J Glynn, Susan Herbst, Garrett J. O'Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Public Opinion*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 269.

nationalistic era'; the indifference and even hostility of the population toward military missions (except for peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions); and the cost-intensity of the technological revolution in military affairs meaning that maintaining a broad suite of capabilities is untenable for any single nation.⁷⁰ Bernard Boëne calls this last element 'structural disarmament'.⁷¹

To conclude this description of the changed (and changing) logic of military organizations in similarly changing societies, the previous tabulation can now be completed:

	Closed System	Open System
Period	1890-1950	1960 onward
Organizational type	Bureaucratic-traditional, hierarchic corporation	Post-Bureaucratic- Virtual and Matrix corporation
Management Philosophy	Taylorism	Human Resource Management
Organizational environment	Modern society	Post-Modern society
Military organizational type	Mass Army	All Volunteer Force

Table 3: Organizations as Closed versus Open Systems (complement 2)

Changing Military Organizations

The Mass Army. The mass army organization type can be described in two different ways: as 'minimalist' (in quantitative terms) and 'maximalist' (qualitative). The maximalist description allows more aspects of the mass army to be taken into account. However, both approaches are complementary.

The Swiss military sociologist, Karl Haltiner, presented a working definition of a mass army in order to describe 'the end of the mass army in Western Europe'. His approach stressed **quantitative variables** related to the structure of the organization, namely 'size', 'social mobilization' and 'homogenization'.⁷² The definition contained the following elements⁷³:

1. The recruitment system is based on universal or selective conscription.
2. The effective strength of regulars and reserves in the armed forces comprises a relatively high share of the national population. This strength can be measured in the so-called Military Participation Rate (MPR).⁷⁴
3. Specific-age cohorts of the male population are liable for military service, and the majority of these military-age cohorts are also drafted.

⁷⁰ See for instance: Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, 'New Roles and Missions, Army Image and Recruitment Prospects: the case of Belgium', in: Philippe Manigart (Editor), *Future Roles, Missions and Structure of Armed Forces In The New World Order: The Public View*, New York: The Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 8-12; Lucien Mandeville, Pascale Combelles and Daniel Rich, 'French Public opinion and new missions of the armed forces', in Philippe Manigart (Editor), *Future Roles, Missions and Structure of Armed Forces In The New World Order: The Public View*, New York: The Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 55-59.

⁷¹ B. Boëne, "A tribe among tribes...post-modern militaries and civil-military relations?" paper presented at the interim Meeting of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee 01 (Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution), Modena, Italy, January 20-22, 1997.

⁷² 'Size', 'level of mobilization' and 'homogeneity' are the three basic meanings of the adjective 'mass' in the sociological interpretation of Jacques van Doorn on this subject. Jacques Van Doorn who wrote in the founding years of military sociology a classic article on the mass army. Jacques Van Doorn, "The Decline of the Mass Army in the West: general reflections", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1975, pp. 147-157.

⁷³ Karl W. Haltiner, *Op. Cit.*, p. 10.

⁷⁴ MPR is a concept that was first proposed by Stanislaw Andreski and defined as 'the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in the total population'. See: Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organisation and Society*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968 (Second Edition), pp. 33-34.

4. The conscripts make up more than 50 percent of the total strength of the national armed forces. This percentage is called the Conscript Ratio (CR). Accordingly, the share of volunteers, especially women, is relatively low.
5. The level of military technology is relatively low. This allows the air force and the navy to rely primarily on conscripts who serve for short time periods.
6. The armed forces are army-dominated, that is, the share of the navy and air force is relatively small compared with the ground forces.

Although Haltiner's working definition is useful, it does not contain all aspects of a mass army. Therefore a more complete and more **qualitative ideal type** is presented as well. In the qualitative interpretation, the following features of a mass army are identified:

1. It is a huge army ('quantity' and 'extensive growth' are basic features).
2. There is a high degree of societal participation in the army through the practice of conscription in peacetime, and through the practice of mobilization of reserves in wartime.
3. There is a high degree of homogeneity. The social differentiation is relatively small. Practically all soldiers have combat functions. The infantry soldier is prototypical for the military.
4. There is a small nucleus of professional soldiers around which a mass of mobilized civilians is enrolled.
5. The functions executed by the military are less differentiated and specifically military (combat functions). As a result, the military is a very different organization from the civilian society.
6. Authority is based on domination. An explicit order, without any explanation, directs the conduct of the subordinate. Threatening and negative sanctions are used in this kind of authority (see also the management principles of Taylor, and the remarks on the problem of control in the mass army treated below).
7. An institutional understanding of the military profession. This is a traditional view of the military profession characterized by vocation, patriotism, dedication and sacrifice. The military feel themselves different from the civilian. There is even a feeling of supremacy over the civilian world. General interests prevail over individual interest. The military are generalists, who feel themselves to be a 'twenty-four hour' military. They are always available. Being a military man is a way of life.
8. Politically, the army has a great deal of internal autonomy. There is practically no control from outside.

'The army of the Nineteenth Century' thus had a classic bureaucratic outlook and was governed by Taylorian management principles. The high status and the closedness of the organization (aptly termed 'walled-in organizations' by Erving Goffman) assured the traditional autonomy of the institution.⁷⁵

The closedness of the military organization which made the military so different from civil society also influenced the internal culture in the organization. They are related with **achieving control and the resulting 'soldiers' culture' in the mass army**. Several aspects related with the culture of the inmates of closed organizations might be helpful to highlight the problem.⁷⁶ During the 1950s-1960s, Goffman, Cressey and Krassowski researched behavior among and between inmates in closed (but public) institutions as mental hospitals, prisons, and concentration camps that contain people against their own free will.

⁷⁵ Erving Goffman, 'The Underlife of a Public Institution: A Study of Ways of Making Out in a Mental Hospital', in: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller (editors), *The Sociology of Organizations, Basic Studies*, New York: The Free Press, 1981 (Second Edition), p. 302.

⁷⁶ Donald R. Cressey and Witold Krassowski, 'Inmate Organizations and Anomie in American Prisons and Soviet Labor Camps', *Social Problems*, Vol. 5, No.4, 1958-59, pp. 217-230.

Their ideas to the same extent can be applied to life in the military barracks throughout the period of the mass army because soldiers during this era served compulsorily. This specific element of holding people against their will, combined with the specific tasks of training soldiers for a job which was life threatening, resulted in major problems for the officer corps. The core problem was how to control soldiers in this situation. The officer corps was admonished to train soldiers, but its over-all success as a corps was measured mainly both by the degree to which 'trouble' was absent during peace time and missions were accomplished in war time. Thus success was measured by the effective installation of obedience.⁷⁷ 'Control' and 'obedience' are obtained at a (high) price. The roots of this high price may be seen through the sociological work of Cressey and Krassowski who describe the effect in American prisons and Soviet Labor camps. Due to the closed character of the military organization their conclusions may also be applied to the study of armed forces. Cressey and Krassowski observed the following aspects in the problem of controlling inmates.⁷⁸ Firstly, they stated that the way control was exercised in barracks depended on the values of the society, especially on the values of persons and groups which had special interests in the army. The officer corps' idea about how a soldier should do his job and behave heavily influenced the way control was exercised. This view was also influenced by how war was perceived by the officer corps. Secondly, two kinds of (contradictory) relationships among soldiers could be discerned. On the one hand, soldiers lived in isolation and conditions of *anomie*.⁷⁹ On the other hand, there was a strong tendency toward self-organization and interdependence among soldiers which is a result of emerging informal groups in which leaders of various types dominated and enforced their own code of behavior. These codes had several core elements as basic rules: do what is asked from you; maintain social distance from the officers; and honor soldiers' solidarity. This code was based on one golden rule, namely the 'law of silence'. Whoever broke the 'law of silence' could expect (cruel) punishment from the informal leaders. Thirdly, both the state of *anomie* and informal organization among the soldiers were of functional utility for the officer corps. The state of *anomie* in which soldiers were kept psychologically isolated and unorganized minimized the danger for revolt, riot, or other collective action. Furthermore, allowing informal organization among soldiers made control complete. It complemented the effect of *anomie* upon the soldiers. These features colored the relationship between officers and other cadres. When a particular group of soldiers was allowed to control the rest of the soldiers, a kind of non-written contract was signed in which a certain liberty of action was permitted by the informal leaders (in which formal institutional rules could be broken) in exchange for control over the rest of the soldiers. In other words, if the informal leaders allowed military training and maintained order among the soldiers, they had freedom of action in the informal power structure of soldiers.

Finally, both the conditions of alienation and of self-organization existed under conditions of systematic deprivation, usually taking either physical or psychological forms.

⁷⁷ A typical practice in mass armies was the tradition of collective punishment, in which the group was punished for a mistake or infraction of the individual. Nowadays, this practice is unacceptable in the post-modern army. Another extreme example of installing obedience on the soldiers in war time was the execution of deserters and of people who committed less important infraction on military law to set an example for the others. This practice was more or less common in the mass armies on the Western Front during the First World War. The fact that this issue is even in the year 2000 a taboo for Western governments underlines that this practice is an anachronism in postmodern times which damages the image of the armed forces. Moreover, it demonstrates that 'functional violence' outside its historical and societal context may seem for the 'distant' observer absurd and inexplicable.

⁷⁸ Donald R. Cressey and Witold Krassowski, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 217-220.

⁷⁹ The concept of *anomie* is a typical sociological concept introduced by Emile Durkheim and further used by Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons. It equates 'extreme instability' with 'demoralization' and 'de-institutionalization' caused by a lack or break down of guiding norms, which consequently leaves individuals with neither restraints nor guidance.

Scarcity created jealousy, suspiciousness, mistrust, and other indices of anomie among soldiers. The officer corps manipulated this situation in order to reward the informal leaders with symbols of power and status. Therefore the officer corps selectively distributed scarce goods, as food, cigarettes, alcohol, or immaterial goods such as free time.

To conclude: in order to install control, a relationship of interdependence among soldiers and officers or 'a system of reciprocal adjustment' existed.⁸⁰ This was probably not an explicit administrative policy, but it was certainly a principal technique for controlling men in the barracks. Moreover, besides installing control, it also made the process of socializing the new inmates 'easier'. The price for this practice was a tolerance for deviant behavior as beating, physical and psychological torture. However, the specificity of the soldiers' job could in a certain way justify these practices: it created hard-nosed soldiers ready for battle.

Officers saw 'toughness' which was obtained by conditions of anomie, deprivation and the reign of informal leaders as a necessary military characteristic which was determined by the harshness of the system of control. The idea of interdependence without much external control, embedded in a specific military mentality, resulted in a soldiers' culture which was difficult to change.⁸¹ Indeed, as long as 'the military mentality', 'the interdependence between the leading inmates and staff' and 'the closedness of the organization' were unchanged, this vicious circle could not be broken; and the resulting perverse consequences could not be avoided.

The Post-modern Military Organization. Parallel with the evolution of the bureaucratic organization to the post-bureaucratic organization, the military organization in the West underwent a similar evolution. The modern organization type (or the mass army) evolved over time to the post-modern military organization. Dandeker has outlined the following features of the post-modern military organization as distinct from its modern antecedent⁸²:

1. Responsibility shifts to lower levels. Even the individual soldier at the lowest level has to take decisions autonomously, even ones with important political consequences.
2. The military job is intensive and very demanding, but also very rewarding, with increased responsibility for equipment, people and the success of the operation.
3. Flexibility means an emphasis on the multi-rolling of equipment and a consequent desire to recruit and retain personnel able to take on multiple roles, creating and necessitating a more flexible work force at all levels of the hierarchy and in all specialties.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁸¹ The 'military mentality' can be compared with what Huntington wrote about the 'military mind' and the 'military ethic'. The first, he described as 'conservative realist' and the latter as 'pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession'. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, New York: Vintage Books, 1957, p. 79. Concerning 'the military mind' see also Feld who stated that '...the emotional and intellectual positions under considerations are the models guiding the modes of organization and employment of military forces...'. Maury D. Feld, *The Structure of Violence, Armed Forces as Social Systems*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977, pp. 33-34.

⁸² C. Dandeker, "Flexible forces for a post cold war world: a view from the United Kingdom", *La revue Tocqueville/ The Tocqueville Review* Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1995, pp. 23-38 and C. Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1994, pp. 637-654. See also: David R. Segal, *Organizational Designs for the Future Army*, Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Special Report No. 20, 1993 and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-11 and 265-275.

4. The 'mixing and matching' of components from different services and countries pose problems of establishing effective command and control links of a lateral as well as vertical kind.

The following features can be added to this conceptual interpretation⁸³:

1. To work effectively, this system requires fundamental changes in the relationship between the military/political center and the force commanders. Here a new and contradictory situation is faced: the political control involves a shift away from detailed control to acceptance of discretion within the constraints of the overall strategic objective. The omnipotence of the media leads to an overall and detailed control of the fourth force in modern society. Besides the media, the non-governmental organizations control the military and even become concurrent in humanitarian operations. The autonomy of the military is fundamentally affected. The force commander thus receives on the one hand more autonomy but on the other is more controlled and constrained than ever by the media and non-governmental organizations.
2. Authority is based on manipulation.⁸⁴ This type of authority is based on explanation, competence of the leader and consensus in the group. Instead of negative sanctions, the leader uses positive stimuli. The military leader has to take into account the motivation and morale of the individual. The most brutal procedures for schooling and training are not tolerated anymore. Primary groups and leadership are key elements in manipulation type of authority.
3. There is an occupational perception of the military profession.⁸⁵ The military profession is a job like any other. The military personnel serve for economic reasons, not for patriotic reasons. The military profession is not a way of life anymore, it is a way of obtaining extrinsic rewards. Professional organizations as well as unions defend the collective interests of the members of the military organization.
4. Diversity, rather than homogeneity is the central characteristic of the AVF.⁸⁶ The introduction of women and ethnic minorities in the military is an example of this trend. In addition to tolerance, flexibility is rewarded in this kind of organization.

Charles Moskos summarized his view on the how military organizations are changing in a typology. This typology is based on the distinction between the institutional and the occupational interpretation of the military profession. The original idea was proposed in 1977 and it has been expanded upon and refreshed over the years.⁸⁷ Moskos' typology, represented

⁸³ These features are borrowed from the literature and completed with some personnel insights. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: Free Press, 1974. Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1, November, 1977, pp. 41-50; Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/ Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring, 1986, pp. 377-382; Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in: James Burk (editor), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162. Pascal Vennesson, 'Le triomphe du métier des armes: dynamique professionnelle et la société militaire en France', *La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1996, pp. 135-157.

⁸⁴ Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, 1971, pp. xvii-xxiv.

⁸⁵ Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1977, pp. 41-50; and Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377-382.

⁸⁶ Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (editors), *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces, Experiences From Nine Countries*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, especially pp. 211-221.

⁸⁷ Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', in: *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1977, pp. 41-50. Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377-382; 'Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Editors) *The Military: More than Just a Job?*, Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. Charles C.

in the following table, is a good summary of the change that is taking place in military organizations.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Institutional</i>	<i>Occupational</i>
Legitimacy	Normative values	Marketplace economy
Role Commitments	Diffuse	Specific
Basis of Compensation	Rank and seniority	Skill level and manpower
Mode of Compensation	Much in non-cash form or deferred	Salary and bonus
Level of Compensation	Decompressed; low recruit pay	Compressed; high recruit pay
Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
Societal Regard	Esteem based on notion of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
Evaluation of Performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmented and quantitative
Legal System	Military justice	Civilian jurisprudence
Reference Groups	“vertical”-within the organization	“horizontal”-external to organization

Table 4: Military Organizations: Institutional versus Occupational

Source: adapted from Charles Moskos, ‘Institutional/Occupational trends in Armed Forces: An Update’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No 3 Spring 1986, p. 378 and Charles C. Moskos, ‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm’, in : Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, armed Forces after the Cold War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 15.

As a final, but important remark, on the post-modern military organization, it is necessary to stress the difference between the concept of an all-volunteer force and the idea of a post-modern All-Volunteer Force. An all-volunteer force is just a way of manning a military organization. It basically expresses a recruitment policy. There are many examples of this recruitment system all over the world. In Africa, Asia, etc., there are many (regular or irregular, state controlled or mercenary) military organizations who recruit their soldiers on a voluntary basis. In this case, soldiers are just paid for their military services. The post-modern All-Volunteer Force, however, is a specific type of military organization, which is found in Western post-industrial societies. In what follows, whenever the all-volunteer force concept is mentioned, it is meant the post-modern variant of this idea. Consequently, the exercise of this thesis is to found out whether the Russian State can reform towards a post-modern All-Volunteer Force. Differently put, the assumption is that the Russian armed forces can not become a post-modern All-Volunteer Force, which does not necessarily mean that it can not adopt an all-volunteer force recruitment policy.

1.3. The All-Volunteer Force in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, an Illustration

The post-modern AVF experience in Belgium, France and The Netherlands took place during the same period when Russia started the AVF debate. In this sense, the experience of these three selected countries is a tool of comparison. It is not the purpose of this study to outline in detail the political discussions of the 'zero draft' in Belgium, the Netherlands and France.⁸⁸ Rather, some general remarks will be presented about the political decision-making process in these countries. What is remarkable is that there are, apart from some very specific national

Moskos and J. Burk, ‘The Postmodern Military’ in: James Burk (Editor), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162.

⁸⁸ For a more in depth discussion see for instance: Jan van der Meulen and Philippe Manigart, ‘Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The Final Shift to the All-Volunteer Force’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 315-332.

tendencies, many similarities in the different political processes in these countries, so it may be possible to speak about a common experience.

To explain and summarize the experiences in France, Belgium and The Netherlands, the following topics for discussion will include: the political rationale used by politicians to justify their decisions; the actors involved in the political process and the reactions of the military leaders to the political decisions; and the principles of military reforms. This presentation is based on the published White Papers of each country concerned as well as on the debate among military sociologists and political commentators on these national cases.

Statistics, based on Haltiner's working definition of the mass army, show the decline of the mass army in the three cited countries. Next a comparison is made with Russia and these three countries which underwent a 'successful' transition to a post-modern AVF in the 1990's. All statistical data for this study are taken from the journal *The Military Balance* from the years 1987-88 through to the 1998-99 editions. For illustrative purposes in the following paragraph, some selective graphs may suffice to make the point.

The Decline of the Mass Army in France, Belgium and the Netherlands: some Structural Indices

It may be clear that a comparison between France, The Netherlands and Belgium (later to be completed with the Russian case) can only be based on relative data instead of absolute figures. A simple glimpse at the population reveals that France is a country of a different quantitative dimension than the Low Countries (the Netherlands and Belgium).⁸⁹ Notwithstanding this difference, some structural similarities in the military organizations can be perceived such as their size, the idea of societal mobilization and the homogeneity of the armies.

The Size. Firstly, the size of the different armed forces has contracted tremendously during this period. Between 1988-1998, the French armed forces shrunk by 34%, the Dutch armed forces declined by 47%, and the Belgian armed forces decreased by 51% during the same period of time. In 1998 France was still using a conscripted contingent of 129,250 men which represents a reduction of 47% in the use of conscripts. In 1988 there were still some 30,000 conscripts in the Belgian armed forces and about 50,000 men in the Netherlands. Belgium and the Netherlands effectively established the zero draft in 1995 and in 1997. Thus, in a space of ten years the French armed forces lost a third of their active manpower while the Low Countries cut their armies in half. This dramatic downsizing went in a relatively smooth and coherent way.

When the evolution for the individual services is studied for France, Belgium and The Netherlands, changes are even more dramatic, especially for the Army (see Table 5): In 1988, the Army (ground forces) made up 63% of the armed forces, the Navy 15% and the Air Force 21% in France. In 1998, these figures altered only slightly: 58% of the armed forces were Army personnel, 18% Navy and 22% Air Force personnel. Notwithstanding the smooth character of the changes, the Army downsized the most in comparison with the more technologically advanced forces (the Navy and the Air Force). However, 1998 figures show that the Army was still the largest force, using more than half of the armed forces personnel.

It may be clear that national traditions play a role in the evolution of the figures. For instance, the Dutch Navy was a large force in comparison with those of other countries which may be attributed to The Netherlands' colonial history. French data shows that the decline in

⁸⁹ With a population of approximately 57 million France is much larger than both the Netherlands which has only 15 million and Belgium with 10 million.


the size of the army was less pronounced than in other countries which may be explained by the continental French tradition.

	<i>Year</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>The Netherlands</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
Army	1988	63,4%	65%	73%
	1998	58,9%	51,1%	66,5%
Navy	1988	15%	16,8%	5%
	1998	18,3%	26,1%	6,1%
Air Force	1988	21,4%	17,8%	21,1%
	1998	22,6%	22,6%	27,2%

Table 5: Manpower Development in the Armed Forces in France, Belgium and The Netherlands (1988-1998)

Mobilization and homogeneity. The mobilization capacity and the homogeneity of the armed forces can be illustrated by the following structural variables: (1) the military participation rate (MPR) in the period 1988-1998; (2) the conscription rate (CR); and (3) the conscription rate (CR) of the different Forces in the three countries.


The *MPR* of the three countries shrank considerably, and they were actually reduced by a half in the Low Countries. This statistic illustrates that armies of the new type, imposed themselves to a lesser degree on society than before because both the active duty and the reserve contingents became smaller over time. It is remarkable that the MPR did not change as a result of the operations that the respective military forces accomplished during the 1990s. This fact is due to the nature of the ‘missions other than war’ philosophy, which do not burden society as much as earlier military operations did in the era of total war. This last observation combined with the MPR evolution in the 1990s may lead to the conclusion that mobilization as a key concept in defense planning is outmoded.



Graph 1 : Military Participation Rate: France-the Netherlands-Belgium (1988-1998)

Even in 1987-1988 the *CR* of the Low Countries was much lower than 50% which, following the typology of Haltiner, implied that Belgium and the Netherlands were only pseudo- mass armies. This gave this force type –not *de jure* but *de facto*- more the character of an all-


volunteer military than of a conscript army'.⁹⁰ This is an important observation because it reflects the fact that the decline of the mass army had been under way for some time. It also reflects the evolutionary character of the process. Based on these figures, France was a more traditional country because it retained a CR above 50% until 1991, but the CR gradually shrank soon after this year. Since 1996, when the decision was made to accept the zero draft, the CR has shrunk in an even more pronounced fashion.




Graph 2: General Conscription Rate: France-the Netherlands-Belgium (1988-1998)

The conscription rate of the different Forces in the three countries show a correlation between the technical character of a force and the use of conscripts. Indeed, the Army, the least technical of all the forces, uses the most conscripts, while the most technical forces use fewer conscripts. The evolution, as demonstrated in the three countries' tables, confirm the decline of the mass army model.


⁹⁰ Karl W. Haltiner, 'The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Fall 1998, p. 16. The 'conscript ratio' is defined as 'the percentage of conscripts compared to the total of a country's regulars without reserves. It indicated the degree to which the armed forces recruit respectively their conscripts or volunteers and is thus of central importance for the characterization of the organizational structure of the military organization'. (*Ibid.* p. 12)



Graph 3: Conscription Rate over the Forces: France (1988-1998)



Graph 4: Conscription Rate over the Forces: the Netherlands (1988-1998)



Graph 5: Conscription Rate over the Forces: Belgium (1988-1998)

The tables presented above illustrate the concept of mobilization's loss of meaning over time. They also show that armies no longer rely on a large number of recruits. Moreover, and this is not expressed in the graphs above, it is also true that the third pillar of the mass army has lost its meaning. Indeed, the armed forces of France, Belgium and The Netherlands no longer strive for homogeneity in their units. On the contrary, diversity rather than homogeneity characterizes the recruitment dimension of the military organization as women, civilians, visible and cultural minorities and even declared sexual minorities are allowed to fill the ranks.⁹¹

In conclusion, the observed countries underwent a relatively smooth, coherent and long-term evolution in which their armed forces changed gradually from one army type to another. This finding has been confirmed by Haltiner, and it also supports the theory of the decline of the mass army. The 'qualitative mutation' from the mass army to the post-modern AVF- as illustrated here with some structural indices- therefore had an evolutionary nature. The stability of the environment was enhanced by the predictability of a bi-polar world, the successes of western socio-economic achievements, and the slow pace of changes which eventually provoked cultural shifts that subsequently contributed significantly to this evolutionary process. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to repeat that despite wide global trends which affected these three countries and their similar evolutionary processes, every country underwent these changes at a unique speed and the process was marked by individual and distinctive national characteristics.

⁹¹ See for example for the Belgian case: Philippe Manigart, 'La gestion de la diversité: personnel féminin et minorités culturelles dans le Forces armées belges' [Managing Diversity: Female Personnel and Cultural Minorities in the Belgian Armed Forces], *Courrier Hebdomadaire*, Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, No. 1630, 1999; More generally, diversity is elaborated in Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (editors), *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces, Experiences from Nine Countries*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999; and for a study on coping with sexual minorities in the Armed Forces, see: Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, *Homosexuals in European Armed Forces: Policies, Practices and Problems*, London: European Research Office of the US Army, 1996.

The following citation, taken from the conclusions of a European study on the socio-cultural aspects of defense restructuring and conversion, summarizes these conclusions. It simultaneously adds a warning against overhasty and incoherent decisions:

“A focus on personnel issues is one possible approach to the study of changes in military organization in the post-Cold-War period. It restricts its focus to the socio-cultural issues in conversion, where human resources are important and manpower problems dominant. In order to get a more general view of changes in the military, the organizational and structural problems need also to be addressed. If this is done, we can see that military organizations have been exposed to a process of long-term transformation since WW2. It is the case that, though this transformation has accelerated since the Cold War, the trends are well known. There is one very crucial characteristic of military organizations, which can be seen from these changes. Military organizations do not cope well with rapid changes. All these changes need to be discussed and planned well in advance, implemented gradually in small steps with the possibility of withdrawing those found to be faulty thus avoiding great damage. It is noteworthy that the post-Cold-War period has generated different patterns of military transformation, in which this need for gradual change has not always been respected.”⁹²

Besides these structural and quantitative characteristics that illustrate the evolution toward a post-modern all-volunteer force, the decision to implement such an organizational model is first and foremost a political decision. Some aspects of the political dimension of this decision will now be presented.

The Political Rationale for Reform

Four main arguments were used to support the idea of abolishing the practice of conscription in the Dutch, Belgian and French armed forces and all of these arguments are located in the spheres of international affairs; national budgets; public opinion; and military affairs. However, each country has emphasized one argument more than the other. Michel Auvray, for example, who wrote on the French situation, observed that:

“...les dirigeants français s'évertuent à concilier un triple souci proclamé: comprimer les effectifs, accentuer la professionnalisation et restaurer l'égalité de tous devant le service.”⁹³

These developments occurred in a more benign and rapidly changing international environment. Internationally, the bi-polar world was finished. The fall of the Berlin Wall, on November 9th, 1989, became the symbol of the end of the Cold War. The disarmament agreements of 1990 (Paris, CFE agreement) and 1991 (Moscow, START agreement) created an atmosphere of détente and threat reduction in Europe. Many Western politicians indicated that these changes would have a tremendous effect and they would ultimately improve the

⁹² Ljubica Jelusic, ‘Sociocultural Aspects of Defence Restructuring and Conversion: Some Initial Conclusions’, in: Ljubica Jelusic and John Selby (Editors), *Defence Restructuring and Conversion: Socio-Cultural Aspects*, Brussels: European Commission Directorate-General Research- Cost Action A10, 1999, p. 313.

⁹³ Michel Auvray, *L'âge des casernes, Histoire et mythes du service militaire* [The Era of the Barracks, History and Myths of Military Service] La Tour d'Aigues: Editions de l'Aube, 1998, p. 237.

West's political relationship with the Soviet Union (and later Russia) on defense policies. Western leaders complimented the Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev for his *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reform) policies. Although the Soviet threat dramatically diminished, Western decision-makers were quick to state that there were still other diffuse risks and threats that should be considered.

These risks, however, were of a completely different order and situated in the spheres of terrorism, ethnic tensions, and organized crime. Threats of conflict and violence had now evolved to the sub-national and non-(conventional) military sphere. The fact that the new conflicts were considered not as strictly military conflicts, but as politico-military confrontations, impelled the military professional to have well developed political abilities and diplomatic skills. In this new strategic context, the link between military posturing and national security is less direct than during the modern period. As a result, the huge armies manned by conscripts of earlier decades became obsolete.

There was also a trend to more international cooperation and integration in order to obtain collective security. Militarily, the Dutch-German brigade, the Eurocorps (with the participation of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain), the Dutch-Belgian cooperation in naval affairs, Etc. are mentioned as examples of this trend. The Dutch supported more international cooperation, interoperability, standardization, and the multinational composition of units on different levels. The integrative power of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union was a political outcome of this trend, which was illustrated by France's decision to fully integrate militarily into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The trend toward more international cooperation can be linked to the economic argument against conscription. Military cooperation enabled each country to share the high costs of national defense. The fact that the Treaty of Maastricht obliged countries to limit their budgetary debts forced governments to reconstruct their national budgets. Budgetary reasons obliged states to make their spending, and thus their armies, smaller. Belgium and the Netherlands considerably reduced their defense budget while France maintained approximately the same level: but all their armies became smaller. The revision of the national budgets also had major consequences for long-term investments and modernization of the military forces. In this context of frozen and declining defense budgets the place of the 'universally' conscripted soldier became outdated.

The abolishment of conscription was also a '*beau geste*' to the public with electoral implications. Military conscription was unpopular in the West because many conscripts saw their service involving a waste of time, a loss of potential earnings. Many of their unconscribed peers in other countries found it easier to find work and subsequently they started to work earlier. Furthermore, the fact that military conscription was far from universal during the 1980's was seen as a social injustice. The equal rights of women, a consequence of feminism in Western society, brought women into the army as professional soldiers and politicized the conventional confinement of conscription to the male population. Military conscription was perceived as increasingly discriminatory. As a result, abolishing conscription was found to be politically fruitful for governments in the West.

The fact that military service became selective can be linked to the military argument against conscription. The progressive obsolescence of conscript-labor became a decade long trend during the 1980's (as shown in the evolution of the CR above). Moreover, in France only 36 % of male population of the 18-22 age group was effectively conscripted by 1989. In Belgium only 33% were conscripted and in the Netherlands only 27% were.⁹⁴ Besides the fact

⁹⁴ Michel Auvray, *Op. Cit.*, p. 233. Philippe Manigart, La restructuration des forces armées belges [Reform of the Belgian Armed Forces], *Res Publica*, Vol. 35, No. 3-4, 1992, p. 435. Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, *Defensienota 1991: Herstructurering en verkleining. De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in een vernaderende wereld*

that this was socially unjust, technological developments meant that the established routine training of men for only ten months could no longer be effective. The more advanced weapon systems that dominate the modern battlefield required more complicated, intensive, and long term training. It is therefore significant that the two branches most reliant on high-tech equipment (the Navy and Air Force) had already employed personnel on a contract basis for some time. The Army, as the least advanced force (particularly in the infantry units), used conscripts extensively until the system was ended.⁹⁵

The change in the missions faced by the military also played a role in the 'zero draft' decision. In the 1990's, peacekeeping and peace-making became one of the armed forces' most important missions. These missions were often situated in troubled regions far from the European heartland. However, it was governmental policy not to send conscripts to the conflict zones.⁹⁶ Only contract soldiers were used for such missions. Therefore, technologically and professionally, poorly trained conscripts - the equivalent of the uneducated blue collar worker in the manufacturing industries - became unfit for military service in the 1990's.

These four arguments were combined to determine the different national governments decision to abolish conscription. In Belgium and the Netherlands emphasis was placed upon the economic and public opinion arguments, and in France the military argument was more important. The lessons that were learned from the Gulf War accelerated these political decisions. However, it is remarkable that this topic did not mobilize public opinion. In addition, conscription did not become an issue in the political debates or programs of any of the parties in any of these countries. There were other military issues that mobilized the public and politicians as the nuclear weapons issue did in Europe during the early 1980's. In other words, the abolition of conscription, a profound decision with great historical significance, was a smooth, even bleak political event.

Even in France, from where the origins of universal compulsory military service can be traced, the televised broadcast of President Chirac on February 22, 1996 announcing the abolition of conscription was a colorless event. This lack of interest reflected the fact that in the West, military service was no longer a social issue across the whole of society. The conscription system was already too deeply eroded. The political decision to end it coincided with societal trends.⁹⁷ This explains the overwhelming majorities which passed the abolition resolutions in each respective national parliament. The conscription debate had merely become a consensus issue. In the case of the Netherlands, the parliament even accelerated the time frame in which the conscripted soldier could leave the service. As the previously cited figures demonstrated, contract service was already an alternative recruitment policy in the three mentioned countries. The so-called 'mixed system' had already existed for decades thus Western militaries were not completely surprised by events in the 1990's.

[Reform and Reduction, The Dutch Armed Forces in a Changing World], 'S-Gravenhage: SDU uitgeverij, 1991,p. 164.

⁹⁵ In this sense the professionalization of the armed forces is most difficult for the Army which is seen as the most traditional, most conservative and therefore most resistant to change. The process of the decline of the mass army therefore represents a severe crisis for the Army.

⁹⁶ Reflected by the fact that France decided not to send conscripts to the Gulf War (August 1990-March 1991). The triumph in the Gulf War can be seen as a triumph of high technology used by professionals.

⁹⁷ It is noteworthy to repeat that this observation may not be seen as a general rule true for all national defense discussions that occurred in Europe. In May 2000, for example, a fierce and unconventional debate broke out in Germany on the zero draft. The lack of consensus in the German case can be understood on the basis of the Second World War experience of Germany with which German society is apparently still struggling. This German exception on the trend that is noted above is another example of how particular national experiences may contradict general trends as accepted in this study.

The Actors Involved. In a democracy based on the division of powers over society (or the system of 'checks and balances'), two fundamental powers play a role in political decision-making, the executive and the legislative power. In post-modern society the media also play an increasingly influential role in the political process. In what follows, the government, parliament and media are reviewed as actors in the defense debate. Where necessary, the relationship of the military institution with these actors will be highlighted and it will demonstrate how the conscription issue became part of a reform agenda.

The impetus for reassessing conscription as part of a military reform program did not actually come from the military organization itself. All the reform plans currently under consideration were instigated by the executive branch, namely the Ministry of Defense. General staffs were ordered to realize the ministerial ideas of change. Thus in Belgium the Chief-of-Staffs Lt. Gen. Gysemberg (1988) and Lt. Gen. Charlier (1989 and 1990) proposed a plan to restructure the armed forces; and in the Netherlands, the 1991 Defense Paper [*defensienota*] entitled 'Restructuring and Reduction', was used and it was followed by Priority Paper [*prioriteitennota*] in 1993.

Even the 1991 Dutch Defense Paper, edited by the Minister of Defense A.L. Ter Beek, still favored compulsory military service. Ter Beek underlined the relationship between society and the army that was secured through military service. Moreover, in September 1992 the Dutch Meijer commission advised against the abolition of conscription, subsequently this commission was accused of being too heavily influenced by the military establishment. It may be concluded that military organizations tried at every opportunity to delay the abolition of conscription.

In a minor form, institutional resistance can be observed. Military organizations drew up cosmetic measures which adapted conscript recruitment to the new circumstances. For instance, they proposed shortening the period of service and proclaimed a greater tolerance of 'alternative service'. They also played with the idea of 're-evaluating' military service. Generally speaking, the military forces were not necessarily opposed to the idea of fundamental change in recruitment policy, but some fought a bureaucratic rear-guard battle against it. Hence, the revolutionary decision to abolish conscription was a civilian decision which was announced by the Minister of Defense L. Delcroix in June 1992 in Belgium and by the Minister ter Beek in The Netherlands in 1993.⁹⁸ As soon as each government took the zero draft decision, their respective military leaders accepted it and revised their plans taking this new reality into account.

However some military mavericks, mostly retired infantry generals, occasionally criticized the government. Their criticisms can be summarized in four main points, they argued that: the transitional period in which the forces would transform themselves from a hybrid to a fully professional army was too short; that there was a lack of financial support for the shift; that there would be various problems with the reserve forces; and that without conscription, the armed forces would be 'losing' the nation's youth, which they saw as a moral loss for society as a whole.

This critique, which was generally isolated and anecdotal, did not influence the political decision making process. Thus, the decision to abolish military conscription did not negatively affect civil-military relations. The democratic idea of civilian control over the military forces stood the test by implementing the decision to professionalize the armed forces. However, as will be shown below, the ongoing reform of the armed forces in Western

⁹⁸ See for instance: Joris Van Bladel and Philippe Manigart, 'Herstructurering in België' [Restructuring in Belgium], *Maatschappij en krijgsmacht*, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 1993, pp. 9-12; and Jan van der Meulen, 'Civiel-militaire betrekkingen in verandering, wisselwerking tussen maatschappij en krijgsmacht' [Changing Civil-Military Relations, Interaction between Society and Armed Forces], in: H. Born, R. Moelker and J. Soeters, *Op. Cit.*, 1999, pp. 31-67.

countries has not been a consistently positive story. Actively obstructing and resisting reform may not be shown openly in the political arena, but this does not mean that organizational resistance does not exist. One aspect of this resistance will be demonstrated in the discussion about the role of the media in the political discussion of military affairs.

The parliaments of each of the different countries were not active in the decision-making process of this debate. Political parties were not clear about the practice of conscription, nor the process of professionalizing the armed forces. Defense issues were not politically important: hence, they were not considered electoral issues. As Moskos foresaw in his postmodern model, the public attitude towards military and defense issues in general is skeptical and/or apathetic. Politicians were more interested in the economic benefits of reforming the armed forces, and they were counting on an ensuing 'peace dividend'. However, what was remarkable was the speed and smoothness (also observed in the structural variables above) of the concomitant parliamentary process accompanying such an important event. Society's implicit consensus on the conscription issue was certainly an important element in this phenomenon. Subsequently the armed forces, could not count on parliamentarians to defend their case in the political arena.

Strangely enough, the mass media was relatively calm on the issue of conscription. They reported rather soberly about the different point of views, and were never a driving-force in the debate. This debate, as shown above, was sincere and modest. The role of the media however is completely different in the coverage of military scandals, which regularly took place in the aftermath of the political decision to install the All-Volunteer Force.

In conclusion, in terms of the experience of the Dutch, Belgian and French armed forces, the political decision to abolish the draft and to structurally reform the armed forces was a politically smooth and efficient process. This can be explained by the power of societal trends which had already influenced the army for some time. Political decisions that cohere with environmental trends seem to have more chance of being successful than ones that do not. In

Main organizational principles of the reforming armies. The strategists in the three countries stipulated the main organizational principles of the reforming armies in a similar way. Michel Auvray, for instance, commenting on French military affairs during the 1990's noted that:

"Technicité, mobilité et disponibilité vont plus que jamais de pair avec une professionnalisation accrue, sinon totale."⁹⁹

The Dutch White Paper stipulated the following organizational principles they recommended the military forces should have: more flexible organizations, more proficient equipment, more efficient unit formation, greater mobility, more and a better means of intelligence gathering, a more resilient command and control system, a multi-national composition of units on different levels, more logistically independent and inter-changeable units, and greater international cooperation, interoperability and standardization.¹⁰⁰

All the principles of the Dutch White Paper were brought together to form the concept of the 'mobile forces'. These forces have been installed in Belgium, the Netherlands and France. They must have a high degree of readiness and must be able to contain a crisis without mobilizing the entire army. It is only at a later stage and/or in the case of a major full-

⁹⁹ Michel Auvray, *Op. Cit.*, p. 236.

¹⁰⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, *Defensienota 1991: Herstructurering en verkleining. De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in een vernaderende wereld [Reform and Reduction, The Dutch Armed Forces in a Changing World]*, 'S-Gravenhage: SDU uitgeverij, 1991, p. 68.

scale conflict that the 'main defense forces' and 'reinforcement forces' are required.¹⁰¹ The reformed armed forces are therefore, smaller, more mobile and generally ready to react with a certain amount of flexibility to any potential crisis.

1. 4. Summary: Towards a Complex Understanding of the Professional Soldier

Today, professional soldiers are faced with acting in a turbulent international environment where local wars flare up in an unpredictable manner. These wars are generally localized and endanger stability in certain regions, rather than threatening entire national territories. The post-modern soldier is thus not a product of state nationalism. (S)he is however, a citizen who is prepared to fulfill a contract in order to protect security of the state in its broadest definition. In this sense armies are not necessarily 'a mirror of the nation'. Consequently, armies are organizations in which diversity prevails. Women, civilians and ethnic (and sexual) minorities find a place in this new type of army.

¹⁰¹ The three countries also have a similar view on possible future tasks for their armed forces: (1) defense of national territory, (2) contributing to NATO operations- in or out the NATO territory, (3) contributing to peace operations; (4) protecting former colonies. The examples of each of the countries emphasize the special relationship with their former colonies. The Netherlands stipulate the protection of the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, while France and Belgium underline their special relationship with central African countries. It is interesting to note that the historical relations of the Western countries with their former colonies are generally accepted, while the Russian 'claim' on the 'near abroad' is interpreted as neo-imperialism.

Thus, the post-modern soldier must show a willingness to adapt to the social and political conditions of each mission and (s)he must demonstrate an attitude of tolerance towards other soldiers and civilians. Combat functions, although essential to a certain degree in every military organization, are now emphasized less than in earlier epochs. Even the skills of the professional combat soldier are changing. Besides being proficient in the execution of combat techniques, (s)he needs to master diplomatic and scholarly skills. The post-modern military soldier is expected to cope with difficult political dilemmas, in which (s)he must constantly evaluate the real situation on the terrain, according to vague rules of engagement. Even at the lowest levels of the organization, a soldier must take responsibility for his/her actions and be able to independently take the initiative. (S)he must be prepared to hold opinions on a large variety of subjects and organizational matters, and also be able to cope with the problems that arise in military life. The soldier is expected to show an interest in educating his/herself beyond the narrow confines of a traditionally strict military education. Subsequently modern military education touches upon topics such as political science, economics, psychology, and cultural and regional studies in order to cope with new missions in peripheral regions.

Because even the lowest levels in the manpower structure of a post-modern army are important, the mutual relationships that develop between soldiers and between soldiers and officers are relationships that are based on trust. The hierarchical structure of the army is eroding and leadership in the post-modern forces is based on conviction and personality, and less on rank and tradition. Small group cohesion, is an important phenomenon, however it is now not regarded as a dominant factor. Ironically the culture of group cohesion, which is linked to conventional traditions and organizational differences from the outside world, can actually be counter-productive when soldiers are faced with political and cultural dilemmas that occur during the new missions.¹⁰² Therefore a balance must be found between group cohesion and the values on which it is based within the post-modern environment.

The perception of the professional soldier is narrowly linked with the ideal model of the post-modern personality which touches all aspects of a person's or soldier's professional and organizational life. This model is a fundamental change from the classical view of the soldier. The prototypical 'peasant' soldier, or even the 'industrial' soldier, would not only be an anachronism in contemporary military terms but also a danger, given the type of missions (s)he might face. Besides, even a well-paid 'peasant' soldier does not fit into the constantly changing socio-military picture. Therefore, the professional soldier is much more than the narrow economic interpretation of the 'paid' soldier: the post-modern, professional soldier is only distantly related to his colleague of the past.

¹⁰² Donna Winslow, 'Rites of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Spring 1999, p. 453.